Uzbekistan is obviously taking a different route towards its security dependence and independence within Central Asia. I think that Uzbekistan?s contributions to ISAF are important because of transportation routes are a contribution. At the same time as well Tashkent has made some decisions about its relationship with Moscow and its neighbours. And so it seems to be trying to choose a path that is more independent of any security body. We have to remember that the CSTO suspended Uzbekistan and that was significant. And at the same time you do see Uzbekistan participating more in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This ultimately suggests its separation from Russia proper in terms of security cooperation through an institution such as the CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is indeed much loser.
And in this situation another bit to surface is that Uzbekistan is considering keeping part of the military equipment which is not exactly the radars but rather some kinds of armaments of the ISAF. Would that actually contribute to the security in the region, given the nature of border between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan?
I think that this is an important development when countries or organizations like ISAF leave equipment behind. We saw the Americans leave a lot of the equipment behind in Iraq. This is going towards the same type of idea but the point here is which type of equipment will be left behind in Uzbekistan. I think Uzbekistan is preparing for the post 2014 period when ISAF is supposed to be out of Afghanistan. Uzbekistan will be the principal point of impact for any type of militancy to destabilize one of the Central Asian countries and that of course is the leadership in Tashkent.
But how would you assess the security situation in Uzbekistan and the role of Islamist forces in that country? Because there are all kinds of controversial assessments.
It is very controversial. Uzbekistan, as we know, uses a lot of force when it comes to dissent. There are major dissenters who are arrested and put on trial. You do have uprisings every once in awhile regarding the Islamists. There is a serious problem in Uzbekistan when it comes to the governance of the President Karimov and his group. And the Islamists are seeking to overturn that order. So, it is a situation where the water is almost boiling and sometimes it does spillover. And we?d had attacks in the past that have killed a number of innocent people as well as armed force being used against Islamic radicals in the eastern part of the country. So, I don?t think that this is going to stop.
Do you think that the US could have any leverage on Karimov?s Government in that?
Well, I think this most recent visit is an example of Karimov listening. But we have to be very careful with Uzbekistan because of the multiple clan-like structures between Tashkent and Samarkand for example, and who rules which institution in terms of ministry or telecommunications and so on, because just like the other Central Asian states there is a constant struggle over who owns what. And Karimov is not a young man and there is the issue of who will take his place on his passing.
If I get it right Tashkent has put forward a plan, a so called six+3 plan on Afghanistan settlement. And this plan includes Iran but it rules out India which perhaps is an indirect sign of Tashkent?s evolving ties with China. Could that be so and in that case how could the relations between Uzbekistan and China develop against the backdrop of Afghanistan worsening situation?
That?s a very good question and I think that the issue here is that the role of India appears to have dropped considerably in Central Asia, at least publically. There has been a talk in the past as you know about the Indian airbases setup in Tajikistan. And the Indians were trying to make inroads in the Central Asia vis-?-vis its relationship with Tajikistan. I think that policy is trying to slip from Delhi side and Uzbekistan would have the Chinese involved in the Central Asia than the Indians. And I think that is reflected here.
Why would the Uzbeks give the preference to China?
Well, it is simple economics and the Chinese have been quite active as you know in the other Central Asian states. And this has helped the other Central Asian states to develop their energy infrastructure and I think that Uzbekistan wants to be a part of that.
You know, there?s been another development which has created a considerable stir in the expert community. And that is a visit of a delegation of 17 American generals who have been visiting Tashkent within the framework of the Capstone Military Leadership Program in early October. Do you think that we could tell a little bit more about the Capstone Military Leadership Program and its interest in Uzbekistan?
Well, the Capstone exercise is mainly to introduce to the participants what is the value of Uzbekistan and what are the issues at hand in terms of its regional relationships. Also it is an opportunity for the participants to meet other Uzbek analysts and leaders and so on to get their points of view of Uzbekistan?s view of the world. So, this Capstone is very important and they serve a function concerning education and the building of new relationships.
And there?s been more gossip about Uzbekistan allegedly developing closer ties with NATO. Could that be so?
Well, that is another possibility as well. Uzbekistan as I?ve mentioned is trying to break away from alliances that are Russian dominated and it is pursuing also a policy very similar to Azerbaijan where there are relations between NATO and other Western institutions. But at the same time you?ll see the Chinese interest in these countries as well. So, they are playing both West and East for their benefit.
And currently, if I get it right, NATO and the US and China would like to see this region a little bit more secure than it is now.
Absolutely, because with the situation in Afghanistan and the withdrawal supposedly occurring in 2014 and then after that this is the soft underbelly of Russia too. And it is important to keep that region stable because if you start to have the intrusion of terrorists or insurgencies begin ? it is going to cause a lot of trouble. And we?ve already seen prompts emerge in western Kazakhstan with Islamists. This is a part of the emerging trend. And we are also going to have to have a more robust border control and counter narcotic operations as well, because this will likely grow too.
The overall security situation in Central Asia seems still to be deteriorating due to a number of long term factors like water disputes for instance in those countries.
The international community needs to be more deeply involved always in the Central Asian security. The water issue is an excellent one because Uzbekistan for example is very dependent on Kirgizstan for its water supply. And we already know about the water crisis. What has been done about the water resource management that would be different from 5-10 years ago in Central Asia. There is also the issue of narcotics. They still make their way through Central Asia up into the Russian Federation and even into the Baltic?s. There is a lot of corruption and a lot of payoffs that are ongoing for drug smugglers. The military and security situation of the Central Asian states is improving in terms of the quality of the equipment, training and so on but there has to be more work done. And I think also law enforcement needs to be better trained and some of the old vestiges of the Russian or Soviet system that still exist in the mental capacities of police and the militia and so on, this need to be changed. And so these are the areas in which the international community has to help Central Asia.
Do you think that the overall complication of the situation could trigger off a chain of new revolutions in Central Asian countries?
I don?t really see a Central Asian Spring per se. What I do see is scrambling of resources as elderly leaderships have to transition. And as you know we?ve only had one real transition but that was a transition between clans and that was the elections in Kirgizstan where you had the northern clans fighting the southern clans and so on. We still have President Nazarbayev, we have President Karimov, we have President Rahmon in Tajikistan ? these people have been there since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the succession issue is very important. What worries me about the stability in Central Asia is that if one of these leaders suddenly passes away who will seize control of the country. And that I think is more important than whether there will be a revolution per se.
So, Central Asia is still something like a powder keg, isn?t it?
Yes, it is. And if you look at the history of the regions since the collapse of the Soviet Union ? there are lingering issues continuing to foster in Central Asia. Although at the same time there are great developments that have occurred too in terms of building Astana and pipelines, and items like that. You had Kazakhstan join the OSCE for example ? that was a very interesting international development. But there are still these lingering problems that need to be dealt with. The Central Asia is no longer isolated and it is an integral part of the security situation not only with the South Asia or China, or Russia, or the Caucasus but also for the Gulf region as well. And I think that the crisis that occurs in Central Asia can have a widespread impact that could affect other countries themselves.
So, after the removal of troop from Afghanistan where all these fighters are going to go next? What about the remnants of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan and what it has become today? Where these people are going to go? They are going to go back to Central Asia to try to form a trouble. And depending on where these groups are within the Islamic universe of violent Sunni extremism ? they might link up with other groups. So, for example, I?m just thinking forward, if a new battleground emerges in Central Asia ? what about the violent Sunni extremists who are getting training in Syria? For example, would they move and be in conjunction with Central Asian?s to bring down a regime perhaps or to cause violence? I think these are the questions we need to think about. The trans-regional nature of the Central Asian affairs is an important topic.
In that sense I?ve been rather puzzled when I was talking to some experts. And they told me that they do not consider Hizb ut-Tahrir a terrorist organization. Well, some do, some don?t.
Some do and some don?t. The Central Asian states like to call HUT a terrorist organization because it is seen, and there is literature to prove this, it is seen as a gateway to hardcore radicalism, although the group itself does not participate in terrorist acts.
But it spreads the ideas of radical Islam, doesn?t it?
It can spread the ideas of radical Islam but it doesn?t advocate the violence. So, once the believers believe enough of the rhetoric that is coming from HUT, then they find another group that is violent in nature and join it. And that?s why it is considered a gateway group.
So, yes, which means that it actually prepares the soil, right?
Correct!
It is so complicated and the impression is that countries of the region just cannot come to terms on certain basic issues.
Well, that is a combination of that and shifting alliances of which outside power organizations want to be tied to in order to safeguard the national security in your homeland. And I think that?s what Uzbekistan is going through today.
Source: http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_10_24/The-powder-keg-of-Uzbekistan/
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Microsoft has released the Windows Phone 8 SDK for the Build developer conference, now taking place on the Redmond campus. The SDK is described as an environment “for building apps and games for Windows Phone 8 and Windows Phone 7.5.” That’s pretty obvious but why 7.5? That’s the odd thing here. It has a stand-alone Visual Studio Express 2012 edition. It can also work as an add-on to Visual Studio?Express 2012 edition for Windows Phone or works as an add-in to Visual Studio 2012 Professional, Premium or Ultimate editions. Microsoft says the SDK also includes emulators and additional tools for profiling and testing a Windows Phone app under real-world conditions. Here are the system requirements from the site: Supported operating systems:?Windows 8, Windows 8 P Windows 8 64-bit (x64) client versions Hardware: 4 GB of free hard disk space 4 GB RAM 64-bit (x64) CPU Windows Phone 8 Emulator: Windows 8 Pro edition or greater Requires a processor that supports Second Level Address Translation (SLAT) RedMonk analyst Donnie Berkholz, here at Build said this to me about the SDK: Windows Phone 8 now provides an end-user experience on par with iOS and Android. The public release of the developer SDK finally makes it possible to nail a critical component of mobile adoption, the broader app ecosystem. Unfortunately the SDK wasn?t released in advance of Windows Phone 8 so developers could have apps available at the release, which will hurt both developers and Microsoft because of the importance first impressions have to consumers. Given Microsoft?s near-legendary tenacity and its clear understanding of the importance of mobile devices, I expect they?ll continue pursuing this until they get it right — if not for Windows Phone 8, for the next release.
